MONDAY MORNING IN THE MIDDLE EAST
There once was an impoverished baker who scraped together the last of his ingredients to make one final
loaf of bread. A little later a man walks in and says, “The previous owner of this shop cheated me out of a loaf of
bread years ago, so I’ll take that one”—and he seizes the loaf. Naturally the baker doesn’t like this and he begins
fighting with the man to get the bread back. Just then a local magistrate comes by and after hearing the issue,
decides to divide the loaf in two. But the baker remains convinced that the entire thing belongs to him, so as soon
as the official leaves he lunges for the other half and the fight resumes. But the man has the better of it and soon
has both halves even as the baker is beaten bloody. What’s more, the man has eaten one of the halves and is
starting to wolf down the other, which makes the baker even angrier. At some point the baker starts to consider
that accepting the half-loaf he was promised isn’t such a bad idea, but by now all the man is willing to let him have
is a handful of crumbs equivalent to a quarter-loaf. Well, the baker has been having a pretty bad day, so he’s not
about to accept this. Let’s say the man has his 6-year-old daughter with him, so the baker starts hitting her! The
wretched baker is certainly going berserk, but at some point the man has got to start wondering if eating half of
the second half was such a good idea. Fade to black.
Fast forward to 9/11. Never has so much been owed to so many by so few. For a terrorist attack, the
destruction was unprecedented—as was the impact on American and global politics. During the immediate
aftermath, there was an enormous outpouring of sympathy and support for the US from around the world. Even
traditional adversaries expressed condemnation of terrorism and sought to distance themselves from being seen
as supporting it. But there was no distancing the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan from the Al Qaeda terrorists, so six
weeks after the attack, the President assembled an international coalition and ordered the invasion of that
country. Afghanistan was a basket case, a failed state, and the Taliban’s extremist antics had shocked the world,
so by October 2001 there was more than enough justification in violating their sovereignty by invading. With 60
nations participating, and half a dozen UN Security Council resolutions supporting it, Operation Enduring Freedom
enjoyed complete international legitimacy. (I read that 85% of self-described liberals supported it. Too bad they
didn’t get any credit for that.)
But there was a lot of opposition as well. There were angry protests in Malaysia, for example, over the fact
that a fellow Muslim country had been invaded by Western powers, and this sentiment echoed throughout the
Muslim world. It couldn’t be helped, but keeping this sort of anger and resentment to a minimum—winning the
proverbial hearts and minds—is a vital front in the war on terrorism. You win a war by reducing the number of
your enemies until you have no one left but friends. We needed to drive a wedge between moderates and the
extremists, not drive them into each other’s arms. Afghanistan was an excellent opportunity to showcase US
benevolence, but if we were going to engage in nation-building, we needed to pour in enough resources to make
rapid and permanent progress. Break the back of the Taliban and rebuild the economy, ASAP. Capturing Osama
bin Laden when we had his surrounded in Tora Bora would have been nice, too.
Now certainly terrorists and militant groups are trying to force the groups they target to make concessions
and to achieve what they can claim are victories for their cause. So as always, it’s important not to encourage or
appease them. Indeed, the way in which Israel withdrew from both Southern Lebanon and Gaza was a mistake. If
you’re willing to make a concession, do it in a way that’s proactive rather than reactive vis-à-vis recent terrorist
attacks or pressure from militants. A lull in the cycle of terrorist attacks, or the period after a retaliatory military
strike, can provide opportune moments to make peace overtures without the appearance of caving in. The
Israelis should have quietly put out feelers to Hezbolla indicating a possible willingness to withdraw from Southern
Lebanon if concrete steps are taken to reduce militant activity in that area. A series of reciprocal confidence-
building steps could have been undertaken with Hezbolla while coordinating the process with the Lebanese
government to put the latter into a good position to take control after the final Israeli pullout. Any attacks during
that process and the deal is off, the clock is set back to zero, and more military action is on the way. The same
process should have been undertaken with Hamas over Gaza. If the Israelis are going to take the significant step
of dismantling all of their settlements in that occupied zone, Hamas had better be willing end their attacks and
defer more to the Palestinian Authority. Israel then needs to hold open the possibility of removing some
settlements from the West Bank, so long as the process of de-militarizing Hamas continues in a concrete fashion
and of course, they change their position on recognizing Israel’s right to exist.
But you have to be willing to talk with your adversaries. After all, you don’t make peace with your friends. Be
firm, and keep the contacts low key so they don’t enjoy any heightened stats and feel as though they are being
rewarded for bad behavior. But you can’t treat your neighbors as though they don’t exist and expect them to act
as if they don’t exist. And while there is a great deal of internal solidarity within the Muslim world, it is not
monolithic, and that can be turned to our advantage. In addition to every government—and besides Al Qeada
itself--we need to identify and engage every faction, party, militia, religious congregation, trade association, and
college fraternity over there. Find out what makes them tick. How might they be a threat on the one hand and
how might they help us on the other. Can they be persuaded, threatened, bribed? Who are their regional rivals
and how can one be played off against the other? Or, dare I say, who are their friends and what potential is there
for forming a coalition capable of doing something positive. (I could rant at length about how American Muslims
and other moderate Muslims should be doing much more to restrain their brethren, but this is about second-
guessing US policymaking.) All in all, what was required was a vastly sophisticated game of carrot-and-stick and
good-cop-and-bad-cop.
OK, let’s say we’ve secured Afghanistan by pouring in plenty of troops, lavishing them with economic aid, and
making the place a showcase for democracy, but Osama bin Laden & Co. still escapes across the border to
Pakistan. We’re lucky that the Musharraf regime supports our efforts against terrorism, but those remote tribal
regions that are dominated by Islamic militants are beyond the Pakistani government’s control. We all agree, for
once, that an American incursion into that nuclear-armed, heavily Islamic state would produce dangerous
upheavals, but if we had kept the world’s attention focused on that particular dilemma rather than on Bush for the
last 5 years, we’d probably be closer to a solution.
Now of all the players whose cooperation was critical but who could otherwise cause a lot of trouble, the most
important is clearly Iran. The Iranians were sort of caught with their pants down after 9/11 in that they were known
to be providing support to terrorist groups such as Hezbolla, given that terrorism had suddenly become very
unpopular throughout the world. If we had brought international pressure to bear on this issue, not only would
there have been a good chance of getting them to halt this practice, but we might have leveraged them toward
greater positive contributions toward the fight against terrorism.
We need Iran on our side. It’s not such a far-fetched idea—or didn’t use to be. On Sept. 18th, 2001,
thousands of people in Teheran held a candlelight vigil to express sympathy for the victims of 9/11 and to
condemn the terrorists. In the years prior, there had been a gradual warming of relations, since it had been awhile
since the last major confrontation (that being the Salmon Rushdie affair). Many of us remember the spontaneous
display of camaraderie that erupted when the US played Iran in a World Cup soccer match in 1998 as a harbinger
of improved relations between our two peoples. Journalists traveling to Iran in recent have reported a surprising
amount of pro-American sentiment among the people there (it’s US foreign policy that they say they don’t like).
From 1997 to 2005 Iran had a remarkably moderate and pro-western president in Mohammed Khatami, and there
has been a significant pro-democracy movement in Iran in recent years. Unfortunately, President Bush publicly
voiced support for it, which resulted in a setback, which served as a reminder of radioactive the US remains in the
eyes of the broader Islamic society.
As we all know, it’s Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Council who holds the real power in that country, and
therefore the keys to much of the problem. Finding a way to get through to them is critical. Attempting direct, high-
level negotiations is not the right approach, but neither is relying on public threats and condemnation. The thing
to do was to make quiet backdoor “feelers” to get our message across to Khamenei & Co. If they’re unlikely to
respond to direct pressure from the US, they we play “bad cop” with good cop being Europe, or the UN, or Russia,
or a consortium of moderate Islamic states. Indeed, much of the game is in securing the cooperation of each
Muslim country or faction, starting with the easiest and then rolling it over to the next diplomatic target (playing the
angles of all the rivalries to our advantage, of course). OK, so we’ve Good Cop conveying to the Iranians our
message that we think they want to join the civilized world in opposing terrorism, or else there “could be
unpleasant consequences”. That’s the “stick”. The “carrot” would be the promise of the eventual restoration of
diplomatic relations with the US.
You see, the support that Iran has been giving to terrorist groups, while unacceptable, does not represent a
serious threat to the US. So a willingness to make a concession would not be appeasement; in a sense, it’s up to
Iran to appease us. “Either you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists” is part of the Bush doctrine, but the
President never even tried to get Iran to be with us! A lot of sophisticated, behind-the-scenes maneuvering was
called for, as I keep stressing, but you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar. By calling Iran part of an
“Axis of Evil”, Bush left them with no face-saving way to respond other than with defiance. On top of that, we
invaded Iraq.
Now the enemy of my enemy is my friend, but we abandoned that principle in favor of the one where if your
only tool is a hammer, then every problem is a nail. And apparently, every nail is a problem. The invasion of Iraq
on top of the invasion of Afghanistan established a pattern in the eyes of the Islamic world of the US simply
invading Muslim country after Muslim country. They think we’re trying to destroy Islam. Of course that’s a load of
paranoid claptrap, but what do you expect? They’re conservatives! We just assumed that they would be happy
that we got rid of Saddam Hussein (in other words, we tried to appease them), but we didn’t bother to make sure in
advance as to how they’d react. All they understand ifs force, you say? Well that’s all they did understand—that
we used force. Freedom and democracy are good things, but if someone you don’t like tries to force-feed you
chocolate pudding, you’d spit it up. War is politics by other means, but if the people upon whom success depends
don’t trust you, good intentions don’t count for much.
The invasion of Iraq was a self-inflicted setback in he fight against terrorism in a number of ways:
· It has physically weakened and degraded the US military, whose strength could better have been used in
Afghanistan as well as in maintaining a ready reserve.
· It has weakened us in terms of our ability to threaten and intimidate actors such as Iran, that is, it has ruined
our “rep”.
· It has strengthened Iran’s hand in the region while at the same time provoking them to re-start their nuclear
program, redouble their anti-US posture, and marginalize their pro-democracy movement.
· It has redoubled anti-US sentiment throughout the Islamic world, establishing a pattern of intervention and
occupation that seemingly confirms their suspicions that this is a “war on Islam” and so they should all join the
“jihad against America”.
· It has made our friends less inclined to help us fight terrorism. This includes both our allies within the
international community as well as ordinary Muslims who might otherwise have been willing to rat out their
neighbors who are plotting terrorist attacks.
However, I never thought that the invasion of Iraq was about oil. It’s always a factor in Mideast calculations,
but it doesn’t appear to be the primary motivation.
Such a violent and humiliating attack as 9/11 put the American people in a fighting mood and we looked to the US
military to go over there and kill the bad guys. All of them. Any bad guys we can find. Win the war on terror. The
Bush doctrine has been to attack any country found to be supporting terrorists. It’s important to deny terrorist
groups the support of national governments and it’s justified, but it’s not the key to eliminating the terrorist threat.
A terrorist attack could be undertaken by individuals from one of any number of extremists movements, but it the
extreme Islamist movement that is the source of the primary threat that we face. Understanding what motivates
these people and how to manipulate these motivations, that’s the key to fighting terrorism. You mean get to the
root causes? Use diplomacy? Anyone who uses language like this is immediately accused of wanting to
“appease” the terrorists. Well, the principle of not appeasing the demands of evil megalomaniacs is important. If
terrorist groups with specific agendas are given concessions in direct response to attacks, it can send the
message that terror attacks are an effective method in advancing their agenda. But that’s only part of a much
broader, more complex equation. Much of the time, the terrorists are out for simple revenge or to “wage jihad” in
broad sense, and they are acting on behalf of the broader Muslim community. An Islamic terrorist can be any
Muslim of military age, from any country where there is a Muslim community. It’s a grass roots movement. There
is not a Muslim Hitler who can be not-appeased into switching off the threat, or whose people can be liberated by
decapitating him, to their eternal gratitude. When we’re talking about 1.2 million people, each of whom may be
grinding their own axe, the “don’t appease ‘em--kill ‘em” mentality has its limits. We’d have to outdo Hitler’s
Holocaust 200 times over.
First, do no harm. We could talk about all the mistakes that have been made which have needlessly provoked
much of the Muslim world, and we could talk about how sensitive and easily provoked much of the Muslim world is.
But if you have to break some eggs in order to make an omelet, then try to break them all in one basket. And
since Afghanistan had plenty of egg on it already, that was the place to go to start breaking things. By the time
9/11 rolled around, Afghanistan had not only hosted Al Queda as it grew into a full-blown para-military
organization, but it’s Taliban regime—fresh from seizing amid an endless civil war, had been shocking the world
with one extremist abuse after the other. If ever there was a failed state ripe for US-led intervention, this was it.
Part of the equation is Muslim sensitivity to what they call Western “cultural imperialism”, and yet bringing in
Western values is also part of the solution. Western intervention in any part of the Muslim world irritates people
throughout the Muslim world, and irritants must be given time to sink in. We were right, but it would take time for
them to realize that in principle, and during that time we needed to make things right in fact. Pacify the warring
factions, rebuild the shattered infrastructure, establish civil liberties, improve standards of living, and convene a
democratically-elected government. Some progress has been made in these areas, but not enough, not quickly
enough, not after 5 years, not by a longshot.
Because we invaded Iraq.
We needed to straighten out Afghanistan in order to make it the showcase of American progressive benevolence,
in contrast to the oppressive backwardness of conservative Islam. You see, Third World people are a fickle lot.
You may invade their country and liberate them from an oppressive regime, but if you bring along too much
destruction and economic privation, they’re likely to turn against you. Responsibility for ongoing violence among
various factions also could be laid at your feet. We needed to move quickly and with massive resources to ensure
that that these things did not become problems. We didn’t. We needed to commit a lot more troops and a lot
more money to Afghanistan, but not as much as we wound up committing to Iraq, you see. We could have
afforded it. We succeeded in establishing a democratically elected government in Afghanistan under Mohammed
Karzai, but he was quickly derided as the “Mayor of Kabul” give the lack of control the new Afghan government
has over much of the countryside. Many cynics in the Muslim world concluded that, since the US can do anything,
we deliberately allowed Afghanistan to descend into chaos, for whatever reason. They’re a suspicious lot, you
know.
Taking out terrorists and establishing democracy while not needlessly inflaming Muslim passions is the real trick,
and I can’t exactly catalogue all the considerations that have to be taken into account as we devise strategy. But
a leadership team who can is a prerequisite to reducing the terrorist threat.
After 9/11, few governments wanted to be seen as supporters of terrorism. The Bush Administration’s policy of
making no distinction between terrorists and states that support them is justified, but a wise anti-terrorism strategy
requires more than simply looking for justifications to attack certain countries or otherwise making them our
enemy. We needed to launch a worldwide diplomatic offensive, playing a sophisticated game of carrot-and-stick
and good-cop/bad-cop. Each government and non-governmental entity required it’s own unique approach in
order to maximize their cooperation and support. The Taliban were to be cooperated right off the planet.
Pakistan presents a tricky problem: Its government has been thankfully cooperative, but it’s an un-democratic
military dictatorship that has little control over the rugged tribal region where Osama bin Laden and the core of Al
Queda are probably hiding. Direct US intervention could be destabilizing enough to bring down Musharraf’s
regime and deliver the country’s nuclear arsenal into the hands of Islamic radicals. So your guess is as good as
mine what we could be doing differently, other than to focus a lot of talent on solving the impasse.
Most of the 9/11 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia, whose monarchal government is also a US ally even though
they enforce a very strict form if Islam and yet are despised throughout the Islamic world. The Saudis have made
a “devils bargain” with the radical Islamic schools, supporting them financially so long as they direct their righteous
fury outwardly, i.e., toward the US and the West. We don’t want to topple the Saudis just yet and create chaos,
but we could be putting more pressure on them to gradually adopt democratic reforms and improve human rights
(and we could be reducing our dependence on their oil by investing more in alternative energy).
We have a lot of troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, and this is not only a major sore spot among Muslims, it is the
primary motivation behind 9/11. No, we don’t want to pull them out; we all agree that appeasing terrorist’s
demands is a bad idea. But being pro-active in finding ways to improve relations throughout the Muslim world is
essential in reducing the terrorist threat. The Arab/Muslim “street” is a very complex mix of radical beliefs and
legitimate grievances. We don’t want to do anything that can in any way be seen as rewarding terrorism, but so
long as enough distance is maintained in the context of a given issue, addressing some of their concerns is
indispensable. It’s amazing to me how we can portray the terrorist threat as entirely a systematic extortion plot and
ignore the cultural grassroots passions of backlash and paranoia. Getting the average Middle Eastern Muslim to
love America as much as the average European used to is a pretty tall order, but “first, do no harm”.
We used the “stick” in Afghanistan (and we didn’t appease them, so get over it!), and the “carrot” there should
have been pouring in enough resources to bring order and prosperity quickly. There are quite a few situations
where playing “bad cop” is just the ticket and we’ll get to some in a minute. But one situation where the US could
have played “good cop” is with the Israelis and Palestinians. We should have pressured the Israelis to be
prepared to agree in principle to remove their settlements from the West Bank and dangled that as the ultimate
carrot in our own dealings with the Palestinians and other key Arab players. What happened instead was that the
Israelis—get this—engaged in appeasement! They pulled out of their security zone in Southern Lebanon under
pressure from Hezbollah and from Gaza under pressure from Hamas. Making these move unilaterally was a huge
mistake for Israel. If they were willing to make these territorial concessions they should have milked them for all
they were worth, floating them as possibilities in talks with the key players, and yes, that includes Hezbollah and
Hamas, respectively. It’s understood that we don’t want to give these terrorist organizations the prestige that
comes with being given the time of day, but there are many lines of communication and other variables that could
have been exploited in getting the message across instead of giving them the prestige that comes with kicking the
Israelis out of Lebanon and Gaza. We’ll pull out of Southern Lebanon if Hezbollah agrees to disarm and the
government of Lebanon agrees to disarm them and the international community provides guarantees along with
troops. The US could then have engaged in some diplomatic arm-twisting (and spent some money) to ensure that
adequate stabilizing forces would be put in place (but I think we all agree that US troops would not be a stabilizing
force in Lebanon).
But the central point is that we need to talk, talk, talk—with enemies, potential enemies, enemies’ neighbors,
acquaintances, and mothers-in-law. Jesus said we should love our enemies, but I’m not going that far. The
Middle East is a complex stew of governments, organizations, and factions. Sometimes I wonder if the likes of Pat
Robertson might be the ideal parties to be sent to talk to certain conservative Islamist factions (and maybe key
liberal reps to talk to what pass for moderate factions). But it was clearly a mistake for Bush to publicly express
support for the pro-democracy movement in Iran. Doesn’t he support the pro-democracy movement in Iran? Didn’
t he know that would produce a backlash? The people the Bush administration should have been talking to after
9/11 are the government of Iran. Iran is key. As an adversary, they are potentially the most dangerous, but as an
ally, they are potentially the most helpful. The Iranians were caught with its pants down after 9/11 due to their
undeniable support for terrorist groups in general and possible assistance to Al Qaeda and the 9/11 plotters in
particular. But you can be sure I’m not the only one who thinks that a major war with Iran was out of the question
at that time, let alone now. But public condemnation for supporting terrorism is something Iran’s leadership would
have liked to avoid, and diplomatic relations with the US is something that they would have liked. Iran’s president
at the time, Khatami, was known as a pro-western reformer. There was a burgeoning pro-democracy movement,
and according to some journalists, a latent thread of pro-American sentiment among many Iranians. The
spontaneous display of camaraderie when the US played Iran in a World Cup soccer match in 1998 seemed
herald a warming of relations, and then on Sept. 18th, 2001, thousands of people in Teheran held a candlelight
vigil to express sympathy for the victims of 9/11 and to condemn the terrorists. It looks like we had a pretty good
opportunity to improve our relationship with Iran, get them more or less on our side in the war on terrorism, get
them to stop supporting Hezbollah, and possibly implement some democratic reforms.
But of course, the elephant in the room is Iran’s Guardian Council and its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.
They are the real theocratic power in Iran, and as such, the very heart of conservative Islam. How to manipulate
these fellows is where our diplomatic efforts should have been focused. Again, lots of sophisticated triangulation
and subtle pressure, rather than blatant advocacy, was needed in order to avoid provoking a backlash. Bush’s
overt declaration of support for Iran’s pro-democracy movement predictably backfired and hurt them, because it’s
not that simple. 9/11 created an opening, but the US remained radioactive in many circles throughout the Islamic
world . The trick is to isolate and shrink these circles while providing cover for--rather than prematurely exposing—
those elements we want to strengthen. But now, forget it. We’re in the midst of a confrontation--albeit one that
could have been avoided—and so now we can’t go all milquetoast. Shame.
I’ve got to say that a major part of the equation has been in the hands of certain Muslim groups themselves.
American Muslims in particular could have been acting as a bridge of communication between the US (and the
West in general) and the Muslim world. It’s regrettable that, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was a spate
of anti-Muslim attacks here in the US, but fortunately, that quickly subsided. And yet 5 years later, American and
other Muslims are still complaining about that as a way of deflecting any responsibility. I’ll say that any
“responsibility” has been rather unfairly thrust upon them, by history, but there it is. Coalitions of Western and
other moderate Muslims need to be at the forefront in confronting the more radicalized elements within the Muslim
world. You know, the terrorists and their supporters.
This essay gives just the sketchiest indication of the sophisticated kind of approach that was needed in response
to the threat of Islamic terrorism and extremism. The need to avoid rewarding acts of violence or appeasing those
who threaten it is important. But the Muslim world is angrier and more threatening than they were on the eve of
9/11, and this is largely the result of the Bush administration’s policies. The flip side of appeasement is
provocation. We should have found a way to preempt that anger rather than worsen it. Victory in the War on
Terrorism is defined as eliminating the desire among Muslims to do violence against the West; we cannot simply
eliminate Muslims.
The only cause for hope that I can see is that eventually the focus in the Muslims will come off of the American
intervention and onto the fact that Sunnis and Shiites are blowing each other up by the score in Iraq. If that’s an
example of how Muslims behave the minute they are freed from an authoritarian regime, then perhaps they might
at last realize that much the problem comes from within their own culture, not just something that can be blamed
on the outside.